

- (a) The current force cannot survive in major strength under well-coordinated enemy attack without quick reaction to tactical warning; which is ambiguous and unreliable. Only the small Polaris force can endure under prolon ed attack, and no current/capability exists to control it. (Airporne alert is a current potential, and preparation could extend the **R*x**triax**tax**summit**x** interval during which planes/on positive control could await commitment).
- (b) No current strategic plans provide for a strategic reserve under any circumstances of central war; all ready vahicles, including all Polaris missiles, are committed to attack preplanned targets as soon as possible.

2. Strict positive control.

- (a) There are currently no realistic procedures for the authorization of a strategic response by high national authority in the event of a surprise attack destroying Washington. All duly constituted officials authorized to assume succession as Commander in-Chief are normally located in Washington.
- (b) In the absence of realistic plans or convincing assurance that authorization for an appropriate response will be forthcoming, there is widespread acceptance of the notion that unauthorized response will be necessary, either at high military levels of command (which are almost equally vulnerable as Washington) or at low. Both this attitude itself, and the reluctance to institute reliable safeguards against unauthorized action which follows from it, increase the possibility of unauthorized "initiative" in a time of crisis, under the stress of ambiguous indications and an outage of communications with higher command.
- (c) Although there are physical safeguards against accident, there are almost none against unauthorized action, either in connection

with individual venicles or in command post operations. Such safeguards are technically possible; in principle, they take the form of a combination lock on weapons, requiring a code sent oy higher authority to unsafe or release the weapon.

(c) Such safeguards are particularly important in connection with weapons under dual control with an Ally; current "protection", furnished by the Ally itself, terves to guard against "third party" action out furnishes minimum inhibition against unilateral action by Allied forces themselves.

"Super-safing" both against accident and unauthorized action is required for weapons on high alert or mobile. Currently, weapons on high alert with Allied forces, nominally under dual control, not only lack such special precautions but are atypically accident-prone, not naving been designed for such operation.

effective response under all conditions of enemy access

It would be unacceptable to lower the mast risk of accident at the cost of markedly raising the risk of deliberate enemy attack; solutions to the problems of accident and unauthorized action should not afford an enemy the opportunity m to paralyze U.S. response totally by attack on the command and control system. Zeven a moderate attack on the U.S. command and control system today would eliminate, with high confidence, the possibility of a U.S. authorized or even coordinated response. Although the design of explicit procedures for authorization under all circumstances raises complicated issues, such procedures could be both safer and more reliable than current tacit, ambiguous and uncontrolled understandings.

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not call for bomb alarm read-outs at it offensive force bases or subordinate command posts. Many units, particularly outside the ZI, might have outage of communications as their only immediate indication of enemy attack, and that would be nightly ambiguous.

- (b) The current design of the bomb alarm system, including means of transmission of signals, is such that a small number of bombs might put it out of operation. Thus, even though it had indicated that an attack involving "at least," say, three four bombs had taken place, it would not be able to indicate even grossly the actual size of the attack, its nature (e.g., whether or not cities were being hit on a large scale), or its gross effects on U.S. bases; nor could it discriminate reliably against between a large-scale, coordinated attack and an attack involving a few weapons, possibly as a result of unauthorized action or ...
 - (c) Almost all information, status-reporting, intelligence, sensor and reconnaissance/are elther totally unprotected or vulnerable in vital links; inputs of data to surviving decision—makers would drop almost to zero at the outset of a major attack.
 - (d) The bomb alarm system as currently planned does not link different levels of in the chain of command. No other highly reliable means of determining the status of higher command are currently provided; Kenekkas; xforkexample; krocketunruexcommunications, which is highly ambiguous feliance is upon outage of communications, which is highly ambiguous

4. Force flexibility.

- (a) Current design of Minuteman missiles makes it impossible to fire fewer than 50 at a time.
- (b) Current design of Minuteran missiles requires procedures which may take six hours to change the target of a missile from its the one preset. If commitment within a few man minutes or hours is required, the currently planned Minuteran force could be used only in blocs of 50 against preplanned targets.

- current plans do not include options for covering alternative target systems; in the absonce of such plans, rapid retargeting of large numbers of bomoers is almost impossible, even before attack.

 * No protected facilities, or planning sids for rapid replanning, would allow such retargeting after attack.
- d) The almost total/lack of preparation for post-attack reconnaissant with protected read-outs and command facilities, would severely limit the possibility of countermilitary action, after initial attacks on the military targets, asakanicking searching and an analysis and a consider the possibility of countermilitary action, after initial attacks on the military targets asakanicking searching and an analysis and a considerable for potention.
- 5. Countermilitary capability.
- (a) Lacking flexibility and the capability for rapid replanning just prior to or during attack, current countermilitary zxx forces would have little ability introduction to adaptate exploit actual inefficiencies or vulnerabilities in Soviet posture or tactics; in any case, they lack the protected information sources necessary to recognize such Soviet departures from conservative U.S. expectations.
- (b) Even if U.S. countermilitary action were able markedly to reduce the weight of attack that the Soviets could launch against the U.S., other aspects of U.S. posture combine to ensure that even a small Soviet attack would be maximally potent;
- 1) The basing of U.S. bombers, missiles, and carriers and Polaris submarines near major U.S. or Allied cities currently makes those cities "bonus" targets in a Soviet attack on U.S. forces. But the current plans for siting new missiles near or upwind of U.S. cities gratuitously adds to this problem. The descent the bare amount to a different turn, that we take the bare of U.S. population and the current is the first of U.S. population and the current is the first of U.S. population and the current is the first of U.S. population and the current is the contraction of U.S. population and the current is the current of the current is the current of the current o
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- 6. Contingency planning.
- a) Current "alternative" options "provide only for differing force size and coordination of attack upon a single, given target system, corresponding to different intervals of warning. They Even in the attack on this system, they do not provide for different patterns of U.S. base destruction in a surprise attack. They do not allow attack of alternative targets systems, or postponement of attack on any part of the given target system.
- by No current option provides for the avoidance or postponement of attack on major Soviet or Communist Chinese cities.
- c) No current options provides for minimizing non-military casualties/subject to the military requirements of Exux strictly counterforce operations.
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- e) to current option provides for the exclusion of jovernmental control centers, or primary military control centers, from initial attack.
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Protected command 7.

- a) See 2(a).
- A single bomb on wasnington would seriously degrade military command capability, but it would virtually eliminate all resitui constituted political authority and all experienced, rully informed political leadership. Such an explosion might be the result of accident, unauthorized action, nth country action, or badly executed or abortive enemy attack: alla events der putting the utmost premium on information, and experience/both political and military.

1. Survival and endurance.

- (a) The current force cannot survive in major strength under well-coordinated enemy attack without quick reaction to tactical warnings which is ambiguous and unreliable. Only the shall Polaris force can endure under prolonged attack, and no current/capability exists to control it. (Airborne alert is a current potential, and preparation could extend the **R**Extractax**countiff* interval during which planes/on positive control could await commitment).
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